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Parental leaveThis paper investigates howmothers' decision to stay at homewith young children affects their subsequentwork
careers. Identiﬁcation is based on the introduction of the Cash-for-Care program in Norway in 1998, which in-
creased mothers' incentives to withdraw from the labor market when their child was one and two years old.
Our estimates demonstrate that, for mothers without a university degree or with pre-reform earnings below
the median, the program had effects on earnings and full-time employment even when the child was no longer
eligible for Cash-for-Care at ages four and ﬁve. However, from age six, we can no longer see any effects. Further
analysis suggests that the effects dissipate because most mothers remained attached to the labor force through
part-time employment.
© 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier B.V. Open access under CC BY license.1. Introduction
Despite a dramatic increase inmothers' labor force participation since
the 1960s, manymothers still choose to exit the labor market temporar-
ily in order to stay at homewith their young children. In the US, the labor
market participation rate among mothers with their youngest child
below age three is 54%, rising to 63% for mothers with their youngest
child between ages three and ﬁve, and further to 73% among mothers
with their youngest child above age ﬁve. In the OECD, the corresponding
numbers for the three age groups are 51, 63 and 66%.16 Stavanger, Norway. Tel.: +47
ri.rege@uis.no (M. Rege).
08 (OECD, 2011).
. Open access under CC BY license.In this paper, we investigate how mothers' decision to stay at home
with young children affects their subsequent work careers. In particular,
we address the concern that such temporary exits may lead to long-run
deterioration of women's post-birth careers (Lalive and Zweimüller,
2009). This is important to countries considering policies that either en-
courage or discourage mothers to work while their children are young.
The Scandinavian countries, for example, encourage female labor force
participation by providing high quality publicly subsidized day care. In
addition to allowing mothers to combine family life with work while
the children are young, these family policies may have consequences
for mothers' long-term labor force participation. High female labor
force participation is considered important tomaintain economic growth
and sustainable pension systems (Burniaux et al., 2003). Moreover,
female labor force participation secures family income and may hence
prevent the detrimental effects on child outcomes of growing up in
poverty (Yeung et al., 2002; Duncan et al., 2010; Dahl and Lockner,
2012).
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with young children could affect her long-term labor force participation.
According to theories of human capital (Mincer and Polachek, 1974), a
mother who exits the labor market while the children are young will ac-
cumulate lesswork-related human capital; the exitmay even lead to skill
depreciation.2 Moreover, opportunities in the labor market are network
dependent (Rees, 1966; Calvó-Armengol and Jackson, 2004). Presum-
ably, a woman who is working while her children are young is more
likely to develop a relevant network for her career than amother staying
at home with her children. Thus, when considering returning to work, a
mother who temporarily exited the labor market might be less produc-
tive and have a more limited network than a mother who chose not to
exit. This will likely be reﬂected in lower earnings and fewer job oppor-
tunities, which may discourage her from reentering the labor market.
Mothers' reentry into the labor force could be additionally discouraged
if staying at home with young children increases the accumulation of
human capital related to home production (Becker, 1991).
Identifying a causal effect of a mother's temporary labor market exit
while her children are young on subsequent career development is difﬁ-
cult because of omitted variable bias. In particular, women who choose
not to work while their children are young may have lower career aspi-
rations than mothers who choose to work, in ways that we cannot ob-
serve. It should not be surprising then if mothers who choose to stay at
home while their children are young have less successful careers than
mothers who choose to work. For identiﬁcation, we study a unique,
natural experiment in Norway that increased mothers' incentives to
withdraw from the labor market in order to stay at home with their
young children. The program, Cash-for-Care, was universal and paid
any parent a signiﬁcant allowance if they did not utilize a publicly subsi-
dized child care slot for their one- or two-year-old child. The subsidy sub-
stantially decreased the labor force participation of mothers of one- and
two-year-olds (Schøne, 2004a; Drange, 2012).3 Our paper investigates
how this labor market exit when the child was one and two years old af-
fected the mothers' subsequent career development, after they were no
longer eligible for the Cash-for-Care subsidy.
The analysis utilizes a comprehensive, longitudinal register database
containing annual records for every person in Norway. We estimate
difference-in-difference models that exploit differences in individuals'
exposure to the program among families with similar structures and
within similar birth cohorts. We ﬁnd that the Cash-for-Care subsidy de-
creased full-time employment among mothers of two-year-olds by
about four percentage points. Following the development in mothers'
labor supply as their child grows older, we can see that, for mothers
without a university degree or with pre-reform earnings below the me-
dian, there is still a signiﬁcant reduction in full-time employment when
the child is four years old and no longer eligible for the subsidy. In this
sub-sample, the estimates suggest that about 60% of the mothers who
exited full-time employment when their child was two years old and el-
igible for the subsidy have still not returned to full-time employment at
age four, the year after subsidy eligibility expired. At age ﬁve, there is still
a signiﬁcant negative effect. However, at ages six and seven, we can no
longer see any effect of the subsidy on mothers' full-time labor market
attachment. Looking at earnings, we ﬁnd similar results. For the sub-2 Some restoration of human capitalmay take place if themother chooses to reenter the
workforce after a temporary exit. InUSdata,Mincer andOfek (1982)ﬁnda relatively rapid
growth in wages for women reentering the labor force, suggesting a restoration of previ-
ously eroded human capital.
3 See also Naz (2004) who utilizes survey data and investigates how the subsidy affect-
ed specialization in families; Hardoy and Schøne (2008) who study the effect of the subsi-
dy on marital stability; and Rønsen (2009) who compares labor force participation of
mothers of one- and two-year-olds before and after the reform. Rønsen (2009) investi-
gates effects of the Cash-for-Care on mothers with eligible children (one- and two-year-
olds) several years after the subsidywas introduced, and refers to this as long term effects.
We refer to long term effects as effects on mothers' labor supply when the treated child
was no longer eligible for Cash-for-Care.sample of mothers with high education or high earnings, there is no
persisting effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy at ages four and ﬁve.
Further analysis suggests that the effects of the Cash-for-Care subsi-
dy dissipate because most mothers who exit full time employment
while the children are young remain attached to the labor force through
part-time employment. Norway is known for a very ﬂexible labor mar-
ketwith a high share of part-time employment. Such part-time employ-
ment may limit the loss in human capital and relevant network when
exiting full time employment.
This paper contributes to the literature studying the long-termeffects
of parental leave policies on women's labor market outcomes. Several
studies show that job protection4 associated with parental leave in-
creases the likelihood that mothers return to the labor market when
the children are older, and that it increases the job continuity with the
pre-birth employer (Ruhm, 1998; Berger et al., 2004; Baker and
Milligan, 2008). Notably, these studies study the effect of labor market
exits while the children are younger than one year. Our paper is closely
related to two recent contributions that investigate the effects of parental
leave extensions when the child is older than one year. Lalive and
Zweimüller (2009) take advantage of an increase in the duration of
paid- and job-protected parental leave in Austria from one to two
years. In a regression discontinuity analysis, they demonstrate that
even if most mothers exhaust the full duration of their leave, there is
no effect on their employment and earnings one year after the parental
leave has been exhausted. Similar ﬁndings are reported in Schönberg
and Ludsteck (2011), which studies ﬁve different German parental
leave extensions. Utilizing a difference-in-difference approach, this
study demonstrates that the extensions, in which the job protection pe-
riod is as long as thematernity beneﬁt period, have no effect onmothers'
employment or earnings six years after childbirth. However, the one re-
form that extended the maternity beneﬁt period from 10 to 22 months,
without extending the job protection period, had a large negative effect
on mothers' employment and earnings six years after childbirth.
The Cash-for-Care subsidy increased mothers' incentives to stay
home with their children up to age three,5 which extends beyond the
two year job protection period after child birth in Norway. Consistent
with Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011) our study suggests that an exten-
sion in paid parental leave that is not connected to an extension in job
protection, may reduce maternal labor force participation even at ages
when the child is no longer eligible for the program. In contrast to
Schönberg and Ludsteck (2011), however, we ﬁnd that this effect
dissipates by ages six and seven. The paper proceeds as follows.
Section 2 describes the Cash-for-Care program and gives an overview
of the Norwegian institutional setting. Section 3 presents the empirical
strategy, and Section 4 describes the data. The empirical results are
reported in Section 5, and Section 6 concludes.
2. Institutional details
2.1. Norway's Cash-for-Care program
After the election for the Norwegian parliament in September 1997,
an alliance consisting of the ChristianDemocratic party, theCentre party
and the Liberal party formed a new government. One of the issues on
their political agenda was the introduction of a Cash-for-Care subsidy.
The Cash-for-Care Act was passed in the parliament in June 1998
(Norwegian Ministry for Children and the Family, 1998).
In August 1998, the government began awarding tax free cash allow-
ances to parents who did not use publicly subsidized child care pro-
grams. Any family with a one- or two-year-old toddler could claim this
allowance. The government stated that the main goals of the allowance4 The right to return to the same job after the parental leave is over.
5 Norway's parental leave is generous, and allows parents to exit the labor force for one
year following the birth of a child. Even if Cash-for-Care is not as generous as the parental
leave, it extends signiﬁcant beneﬁts until a child's third birthday.
Child’s age 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Age 1 0 0–5 0–11 0–11 0–11 0–11 0–11 0–11 0–11
Age 2 0 0–5 12 12 12 12 12 12 12
Age 3 0 0 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12 1–12
Age 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 5 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 7 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 9 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Age 10 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Notes: The number in each cell denotes months of Cash-for-Care eligibility. The darkly shaded cells represent 
fully treated children, whereas the lightly shaded cells represent partly treated children. The first cohort that is 
partly treated was born in 1996. The first cohort that is fully treated was born in 1998.
Fig. 1.Months of eligibility.
8 We assume that families who received the subsidy for a two-year-old child also re-
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children, to allow families themselves to choose what kind of care they
wished for their children, and to equalize public transfers to families —
regardless of what kind of care the family wanted or had access to for
their child.
At the time of introduction, the Cash-for-Care allowance constituted
a signiﬁcant part of family earnings even for high-income families. The
annual allowancewasNOK 36,000,6 and the average annual fee for pub-
licly subsidized child care was about NOK 34,600 with some price sub-
sidies for low-income families. Bettinger et al. (in press) demonstrate
that for a family in the bottom income quartile, the effective after-tax
price of a full-time day care slot for a one- or a two-year-old constituted
about 40% of average family earnings. For the third and fourth income
quartiles, theCash-for-Care allowance constituted15and10% respectively.
While the Cash-for-Care programwas implemented simultaneously
throughout Norway, there is variation in time and the ages of eligible
children. Starting in August 1998, all one-year-old childrenwere eligible
for the Cash-for-Care allowance, from the month after they turned one
year-old. From January 1999, both one- and two-year-old children
were eligible.7 As a consequence, all children born from 1998 onward
were eligible for 24 months of the Cash-for-Care allowance. For these
children, eligibility started at the end or close to the end of maternity
leave. We will refer to these children as fully treated. Children born
prior to 1996 are not affected by the Cash-for-Care allowance. Children
born in 1996 or 1997 could be eligible for as little as one month and as
many as 24 months of the Cash-for-Care allowance. We will refer to
these children as partly treated.
Fig. 1 describes the nature of the treatment. Each cell represents the
age of a child in a given year. Each cohort of children can be followed di-
agonally in this matrix. The darkly shaded cells represent fully treated
children, whereas the lightly shaded cells represent partly treated chil-
dren. The numbers in each cell denote how many months the mother
of a child at a given age in a given year was eligible for the subsidy.
Note that we have also shaded the cells of some of the older children
not eligible for the Cash-for-Care subsidy. As we can see, these cells illus-
trate childrenwhowere treated as one or two-year-olds. If the Cash-for-
Care subsidy had a persistent effect on the mothers' labor supply, we
should see a treatment effect in these cells.
The uptake of the Cash-for-Care programwas substantial. Fig. 2 shows
the number of children who received the subsidy (the entire subsidy or
parts of it) in the 1998–2001 period. As we can see, in 1999, the ﬁrst
year inwhich all familieswith one- and two-year-old childrenwere eligi-
ble, three out of four families received a partial or full subsidy. It is also
worth noting that the number of families receiving the subsidy is quite6 According to the National Bank of Norway 1 Euro = 8.1 NOK in 2000.
7 Therewas an exemption from this rule for all childrenwho turned two years old after
August 1, 1998. This exemption ensured that no children had a break in eligibility from the
Cash-for-Care allowance.similar regardless of the age of the child. Only approximately 5000 fami-
lies stopped receiving the subsidywhen their child turned two years old.8
2.2. Norwegian parental leave, child care and female labor market
participation
In the decade prior to the introduction of the Cash-for-Care subsidy,
there was a substantial increase in female labor market participation in
Norway. In 1991, 74% of married or cohabitant mothers with children
aged 0–15 years were working. At the time of the introduction of
the Cash-for-Care subsidy in 1998, this ﬁgure had increased to 81%
(Kjeldstad and Rønsen, 2002). However, the incidence of part-time
employment is above the OECD average.9 Women are in general over-
represented in the public sector, particularly in occupations related to
health and social work, where the prospect of obtaining a part-time job
is good (Tronstad, 2007).
The Norwegian government introduced the Cash-for-Care program
at a time of extensive use of publicly subsidized day care. About 40%
of children aged one or two years used publicly subsidized day care,10
and there was a short supply of these day care programs. Moreover, at
the time of its introduction, parents were entitled to 42 weeks of paren-
tal leave with full compensation, or alternatively 52 weeks with 80%
wage compensation,11 in addition to one year of unpaid job protection
for each parent in connection with child birth. The Cash-for-Care
program made it less costly to extend the period at home with the
child before returning to work. However, if a mother chose to stay
homewith her children until age three her job would not be protected.
If a family wanted to receive the Cash-for-Care allowance, they
would either have to take care of their child themselves or use informal
care (e.g., relative, neighbor, or home-based day care). In Norway,
formalized care consists almost exclusively of public and publicly subsi-
dized private day care centers. The two types of centers are regulated by
the same law; they basically offer the same type of program, have the
same price schedule for parental pay and are equally subsidized. As
there were very few private day care centers that did not run publicly
subsidized programs, Cash-for-Care recipients in practice did not have
the option of using private formalized care.
The Cash-for-Care programgave families strong incentives to reduce
labor supply and substitute formal care with parental care, or to substi-
tute formal care with informal care. Rønsen (2001) demonstrates that
the program increased both parental time at home and time in informal
day care. Moreover, the Cash-for-Care allowance decreased eligibleceived it when the child was one.
9 OECD Family Database, based on statistics from 2007 (OECD, 2011).
10 OECD LaborMarket Statistics: http://stats.oecd.org/ and Statistics Norway, Ofﬁcial Sta-
tistics of Norway: Kindergartens 1998.
11 In 2009, parental leavewas extended to 46 weeks of full compensation or 56 weeks of
80% compensation.
All One-year-olds Two-year-olds % of all children aged 
one or two
1998 61,243 47,983 13,260 50.1
1999 89,592 46,598 42,994 74.8
2000 88,234 46,988 41,243 74.3
2001 87,580 46,549 41,031 73.2
Notes: The subsidy was introduced for one-year-olds from August 1, 1998 and for two-year-olds from January 1, 
1999. Source:Norwegian Welfare Administration 
Fig. 2. Families receiving the Cash-for-Care subsidy.
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points across the whole population but had no effect on fathers' labor
force participation (Schøne, 2004a; Drange, 2012).2.3. Other family reforms
During the years prior to the introduction of the Cash-for-Care al-
lowance in 1998, Norway implemented several work–family-related
policies. In particular, there was a large extension in paid parental
leave between 1986 and 1993. In 1986, Norwegian parents were
granted 18 weeks of paid parental leave, but during subsequent years,
leave rights were gradually extended to 35 weeks in 1992 and to
42 weeks in 1993. Moreover, in 1993, Norway introduced a paternity
quota of paid parental leave. Of the 42 weeks of paid parental leave,
four weeks were reserved exclusively for the father.12
Notably, the parental leave policieswere initiated at least three years
prior to the introduction of the Cash-for-Care allowance, and at least
ﬁve years before the birth of the ﬁrst cohort that was fully entitled to
the allowance. As such, these policies should not be of any concern for
our identiﬁcation strategy if uptake was immediate. The uptake of the
expansions in parental leave was immediate. However, the paternity
quota was not extensively used until two years after implementation.
The slow uptake of the paternity quota may raise a concern for our
analyses because it implies that our partially treated younger siblings
were fully affected by the paternity quota, whereas our control group
was only partially affected by the quota. Empirical investigations of the
paternity reform suggest, however, that the paternity quota had no sig-
niﬁcant effect on mothers' labor supply (Rege and Solli, in press; Cools
et al., 2013).
Another reform relevant to our study is the 1997 school reform that
changed the school starting age from age seven to age six. All children in
our sample started school at age six, so even if mothers' labor supply
might be affected by their children starting school earlier,13 the same
effect should be prevalent for both the comparison and treatment
groups. The school reformmay still be of concern because it led to an in-
crease in the cover of publicly subsidized day care slots in 1997, because
six-year-olds were no longer in need of child care slots. This increase in
day care availability could possibly increase mothers' labor force partic-
ipation while having young children14 and thereby bias our estimates
downward. However, considering the development in child care slots
for the age groups in question, there seems to be little evidence of a
spike in child care attendance for ﬁve-year-olds in 1997 or the following
years, suggesting that child care for this age group was not rationed at
the time.15 For the two-year-olds, however, there is an increase in
enrolled children in 1997. We carefully address this concern in the
empirical strategy.12 Since 1993 the paternity quota has been extended multiple times. As the ﬁrst exten-
sion was in 2005, these extensions did, however, not affect the cohorts in our study.
13 Gelbach (2002) ﬁnds that mothers' labor supply increases when their oldest child
starts school.
14 See, for instance, Baker and Milligan (2008).
15 Statistics Norway 2003 (http://www.ssb.no/nos_barnehager/nos_d328/tab/tab-3.
html).Finally, at the time of our study, the government implemented a re-
formgiving singlemothers stronger incentives to reenter the labormar-
ket. The reform was gradually implemented, starting January 1st 1998,
and entailed work requirements and higher in-work beneﬁt levels.
According to Mogstad and Pronzato (2009), this led to an increase in
single mothers' labor force attachment. Given the gradual phase-in of
this policy change, it is hard to determinewhether and how it would af-
fect our treatment and control groups. We include a covariate capturing
whether the family is a single-mother household in all analyses unless
otherwise stated. Moreover, a robustness analysis, in which we exclude
the group of single mothers, provides similar results as the main analy-
sis. These analyses are not reported in the paper but are available from
the authors upon request.
3. Empirical strategy
To estimate the effects of the Cash-for-Care program on mothers'
long-term labor market outcomes, we exploit variation across similar
families over time in a difference-in-difference analysis. The shading
in Fig. 1 illustrates the nature of the treatment. We can see from Fig. 1
that children born in 1995 represent the latest cohort that is not treated,
and children born in 1998 represent the ﬁrst cohort that is fully treated.
We estimate the following difference-in-difference coefﬁcient for the
effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy when the children are a years old
(for a = 2, 3, 4, 5 and 6 years old):
γa ¼ lsa;98þa−lsa;95þa
 
− lsaþ3;98þa−lsaþ3;95þa
 
ð1Þ
where lsa,y denotes the labor force participation rate of mothers of chil-
dren age a in year y. The difference-in-difference coefﬁcient γa mea-
sures the changes in full-time attachment between year 1995 + a and
year 1998 + a for mothers of a year-olds compared with mothers of
a + 3 year-olds.
To understand better our difference-in-difference approach, let us
start by considering how the introduction of the Cash-for-Care subsidy
affected eligible mothers of two-year-olds. By substituting a = 2 in
Eq. (1), we get:
γ2 ¼ ls2;00−ls2;97
 
− ls5;00−ls5;97
 
: ð2Þ
The children from the 1995 and 1998 cohorts are two years old in
1997 and 2000, respectively. Thus, we can look at how Cash-for-Care el-
igibility affected mothers of two-year-olds by examining the difference
in the labor supply of mothers of two-year-olds between 1997 and
2000, which is the ﬁrst difference in Eq. (2). Of course, there are many
factors aside from the Cash-for-Care subsidy that may affect mothers'
labor force participation between 1997 and 2000. Note from Fig. 1 that
in 2000, ﬁve-year-olds are the youngest cohort who never received
the Cash-for-Care subsidy. Thus, we can control for these other factors
by subtracting the difference in labor force participation of mothers of
ﬁve-year-olds between 1997 and year 2000, which is the second
difference in Eq. (2). If trends in labor force participation are identical
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effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy on mothers of two-year-olds.
When investigating how the Cash-for-Care subsidy affectedmothers
of three-year-olds, we follow the same cohorts and look at the same
difference-in-difference one year forward. This will give us the γ3
difference-in-difference coefﬁcient. Similarly, we obtain the γ4 coefﬁ-
cient by following the same cohorts and look at the same difference in
differences two years forward, and so on.
In our empirical analyses, we estimate γa by restricting the sample to
mothers of two- and ﬁve-year-olds in 1997 and 2000, respectively, and
then estimate the following difference-in-difference model:
lsa;i ¼ α þ βagea;i þ λyear98þa;i þ γa agea;iyear98þa;i
 
þ ηXi þ εi ð3Þ
where lsa,i is mother i's labor market outcome when the child is a years
old, agea,i is a dummy indicating whether the child is a years old,
year98 + a,i is a dummy indicating whether the year is 1998+ a, and X is
a vector capturing a rich set of observable characteristics of the child,
mother and father that may inﬂuence the mother's labor market out-
come.16 These variables are all observed prior to the introduction of the
Cash-for-Care subsidy and are speciﬁed in Section 4.
The difference-in-difference model in Eq. (3) will provide an unbi-
ased estimate of γa if the trends in labor supply of mothers of a year-
olds and a+ 3 year-olds would have been the same in the absence of
the Cash-for-Care subsidy. There are several ways in which this identi-
fying assumption might be violated. Below we elaborate on how we
address possible challenges to the identifying assumption.
3.1. Trends in labor force participation
We know that mothers increased their labor market participation
during the 1990s. This increase was not necessarily the same for
mothers of children of different ages. Moreover, we could imagine
that changing labor market conditions affected mothers differently
across time and across the age of the children. By thoroughly exploring
pre-trends in labor force participation and by performing a placebo test,
we investigate the validity of our identifying assumption. Notably, this
investigation also addresses the possible concern of mothers' labor
force participation being affected by diverging trends in child care avail-
ability due to the 1997 school reform that changed the school starting
age from age seven to age six (see Section 2.3). Diverging trends in
child care availability could also be a direct consequence of the Cash-
for-Care subsidy. In particular, child care availability for ﬁve-year-olds
could have been affected by the Cash-for-Care reform if the reform
causedmothers of toddlers to not utilize child care, and this again affect-
ed the availability of child care for mothers of older children. If mothers
ofﬁve-year-olds in 2000workedmore thanmothers ofﬁve-year-olds in
1997 due to better accessibility of child care, then our difference-in-
difference approach would produce a negative estimate even if work
force participation among mothers of two-year-olds is not affected by
the subsidy (mothers of the young childrenmight send their child to in-
formal care arrangements).17 In a robustness test we have investigated
this concern by includingmunicipality level child care coverage rates for
ﬁve-year-olds in 1997 and 2000 — separately and interacted with
the child's age. The results are robust to including these additional
covariates.1816 Alternatively, we could use a triple difference approach as in Schøne (2004a,b), ana-
lyzing the change in labor force participation for the same individual from a pre- to a
post-period. This would give us somewhat larger estimates (results from triple difference
approach are not reported; available from authors on request). The advantage of the double
difference is that is allows us to control for a rich set of parental characteristics at baseline.
17 Note that this would also be a reform effect, but the interpretation is different, andwe
should not expect any long term effects on labor supply for mothers of younger children.
18 Results are available from the authors upon request.3.2. Fertility
Policies implemented to mitigate costs connected to the birth of a
new child might increase fertility.19 A sample selection criterion for all
four groups in this study (comparison and treatment group, before
and after the policy change) is that the children do not have a new sib-
ling prior to the year they turn seven years old.20 A possible fertility ef-
fect of the subsidy could affect the composition of the groups differently
through this sample selection criterion. In particular, the youngest co-
horts have younger mothers when the policy is introduced, and are
thus more likely to have new siblings if the reform affects fertility.21
First, we address this concern by demonstrating that our results are
robust to the inclusion of children with younger siblings. Second, we
construct a sample of mothers with children born in the relevant
years without imposing any selection criteria. We proceed to run the
exact same regression as in the main speciﬁcation, with the exact
same covariates, but with the outcome being if the mother has a new
baby by year seven. If the subsidy indeed increased fertility to a larger
extent for the youngest cohorts, we should expect a positive coefﬁcient
when implementing this speciﬁcation on the unrestricted sample.
3.3. Timing of fertility
If parents could anticipate the introduction of the subsidy and time
the birth of their child, this could lead to selection into the treatment
group and thereby bias the results. Keeping in mind from Section 3.1
that the ﬁnal decision on the implementation of the subsidy came in
June 1998, timing of birth in 1998 should not be of major concern.22
There was, however, a public debate on the issue prior to the election
in September 1997. One could imagine that some parents wanted to
postpone conception to after the electionwhen they possessedmore in-
formation on whether the subsidy would actually be implemented. The
result would be that some children that would otherwise have been
born late 1997 were instead born in 1998. To explore possible fertility
effectswewill display the number of children born bymonth for the co-
horts 1996 (benchmark), 1997 and 1998.
4. Data
We utilize registry data called FD-trygd, which is a combination of
several Norwegian registry databases provided by Statistics Norway.
Our dataset contains records for every Norwegian resident from 1992
to 2005. The data provides individual demographic information
(marital status, spouse identiﬁer, sex, age, number of children), socio-
economic data (years of education, income, wealth), current employ-
ment status (full time, part time, minor part time, self-employed),
indicators of participation in any of Norway's welfare programs and
geographic identiﬁers for county, municipality and neighborhood of
residence. Importantly, the data contain identiﬁers for mother and
father, which allow us to match the children to their parents.
As described in our empirical analysis section, our main analytic
sample consists of all children of two and ﬁve years old in 1997 and
2000, respectively. We further restrict the sample to children who
have no younger siblings at age seven. We make this restriction in
order to ensure that the older children in the control group do not
have treated siblings.23 Lastly, we restrict the sample to mothers who
we can observe throughout all relevant periods, i.e. when the child is19 See for instance Lalive and Zweimüller (2009).
20 Wemake this restriction in order to ensure that the older children in the control group
do not have treated siblings.
21 In fact, the cohort born in 1992 has already turned seven when the subsidy is intro-
duced, so in this group selection due to the subsidy cannot happen by deﬁnition.
22 All children in our sample are born in 1998 or prior to 1998.
23 Asdiscussed in Section 3, this restriction is potentially endogenous if the reformaffect-
ed fertility. However, our empirical analyses address this concern by demonstrating that
our results are robust to the inclusion of children with younger siblings.
27 Parenthetical documentation on any control variable indicates the ranges of the series
of categorical variables that characterize the speciﬁc trait.
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Fig. 3. Trends in mothers' full time employment and mothers' earnings.
130 N. Drange, M. Rege / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 125–136two, three, four,ﬁve, six and seven years old (treatment group) andﬁve,
six, seven, eight, nine and ten years old (control group).
We analyze how the Cash-for-Care subsidy affected mothers' long-
term labor market attachment by using several different outcome vari-
ables. All outcome variables are constructed for each of the years when
the child is 2–7 years old for the children aged two years in 1997 and
2000, and for each of the years when the child is 5–10 years old for
the children aged ﬁve years in 1997 and 2000. Our key outcome,
which we refer to as full-time employed, is a variable denoting whether
the mother is working more than 30 h per week at the end of the
year. Inspection of the data reveals that some individuals are recorded
as full-time employed despite very low recorded earnings or even
zero earnings. This is likely because of lags in ﬁrms' submissions of em-
ployer information.We address this by coding everybodywith earnings
that precludes employment as non-employed.24 We also use an em-
ployment variable capturing whether the mother was either full-time
or part-time employed, which we refer to as employed. A mother is
coded as employed if she is registered as working minor part time,
part time or full time and has earnings above a certain threshold.25
Finally, we use earnings as an outcome measure.26 This variable
includes all earnings that qualify for pension points in the Norwegian
Social Insurance Scheme, i.e. income from employment and self-em-
ployment, as well as work related transfers such as sickness beneﬁt,
parental leave beneﬁt, disability pension and unemployment beneﬁt.
We avoid using log earnings because all mothers are included in the
earnings analyses, including those who are not working and have zero
earnings. All mothers have to be included in the earnings analysis, as
the sample of working mothers is endogenous to the Cash-for-Care
reform.
Our data allows us to construct several control variables capturing
important child, father and mother characteristics that we include in24 Everybodywith an income less than 2 G is coded as not being full-time employed. G is
set by the Norwegian Labour and Welfare Administration every year and is included in
most formulae for welfare transfers. In 1997, G was NOK 42,000.
25 Earnings above 0.25 G.
26 Earnings formothers are inﬂation adjusted to the 1997 level by the change in earnings
in the entire female population (aged 20–67).our regression analyses. In order to ensure that covariates are not en-
dogenous to the reform, all covariates are collected from a baseline
year, prior to the introduction of the Cash-for-Care subsidy. For the chil-
dren aged two years in 1997 and 2000, we collect covariates from the
year prior to their birth in 1994 and 1997. For the children aged ﬁve
years in 1997 and 2000, we collect covariates when these children are
two years old in 1994 and 1997. Since the Cash-for-Care subsidywas in-
troduced in 1998, this assures that all covariates are measured prior to
the introduction of the subsidy. Our control variables include the follow-
ing: child gender, number of children (0, 1, 2, 3, 4,≥5),27mother's age at
birth of youngest child (b20, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44,≥45),
age at birth of oldest child (b20, 20–24, 25–29, 30–34, 35–39, 40–44,
≥45), father's age at birth of youngest child, parents' education (com-
pleted high school, completed college), linear and quadratic controls
for parents' earnings, parents' employment status (minor part time,
part time or full time), indicator for parents receiving any social welfare
beneﬁts, indicator for parents living in a densely populated area (city),
indicator for parents' immigration status, indicator for being a single
mother, and municipality-speciﬁc unemployment rates interacted
with the age of the children. Finally, we include municipality-ﬁxed
effects.5. Empirical results
5.1. Summary statistics
Fig. 3 shows the trends in mothers' full-time employment28 and
mothers' earnings throughout the 1990s. Included are mothers of two-28 Because of a change in the registration procedure in Statistics Norway, there is a surge
in missing values for the labor supply variable in 1998 and 1999. The share of missing
values is similar for mothers of children of different ages and is, according to Statistics
Norway, a result of a change in registration routines during these particular years. To en-
sure that our results are not biased by these changes, we run regressionswith various def-
initions of full-time employment based on earnings. These analyses provide similar results
and are available from the authors upon request.
Table 1
Summary statistics.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Treat/pre Treat/post D Comp./pre Comp/post D D-in-D
Born 1995 Born 1998 Born 1992 Born 1995
Panel A: Outcome var.
Mother full-time age 2/5 0.300 0.264 −0.036** 0.328 0.335 0.007 −0.044**
Mother full-time age 4/7 0.333 0.369 0.036** 0.353 0.413 0.060** −0.024**
Mother full-time age 7/10 0.412 0.417 0.005 0.436 0.448 0.012** −0.007
Mother earnings age 2/5 117,100 110,826 −6274** 130,864 136,271 5407** −11,681**
Mother earnings age 4/7 131,989 134,834 2845** 140,527 146,629 6102** −3257**
Mother earnings age 7/10 146,458 147,995 1537* 152,499 154,941 2442** −905
Panel B: Child characteristics
2 children 0.452 0.450 −0.002 0.441 0.452 0.010** −0.012*
3 children 0.266 0.269 0.003 0.263 0.266 0.003 0.000
4 children 0.063 0.064 0.001 0.066 0.062 −0.004 0.005+
5 children or more 0.020 0.020 0.000 0.020 0.019 −0.001 0.001
Gender = girl 0.491 0.493 0.002 0.488 0.491 0.004 −0.002
Panel C: Parent characteristics
M prior earnings 139,004 139,624 620 115,718 116,814 1096 −477
M minor part-time prior 0.122 0.129 0.007* 0.156 0.165 0.008** −0.002
M part-time prior 0.113 0.118 0.005+ 0.125 0.132 0.007** −0.002
M full-time prior 0.401 0.427 0.026** 0.294 0.323 0.029** −0.003
M high school 0.513 0.580 0.066** 0.465 0.529 0.064** 0.002
M college 0.244 0.283 0.038** 0.231 0.255 0.024** 0.015**
M age 30.506 31.012 0.507** 30.102 30.505 0.403** 0.104+
M immigrant 0.068 0.075 0.007** 0.065 0.073 0.008** −0.001
M on welfare 0.050 0.049 −0.001 0.062 0.061 −0.002 0.001
M urban area 0.757 0.755 −0.002 0.749 0.761 0.012** −0.014**
Single mum 0.148 0.147 −0.001 0.165 0.148 −0.017** 0.016**
Unemployed 0.028 0.023 −0.005** 0.028 0.023 −0.005** 0.000
F prior earnings 247,514 249,342 1828 266799 262,752 −4047** 5875**
F minor part-time prior 0.023 0.029 0.006** 0.019 0.021 0.003* 0.003+
F part-time prior 0.019 0.019 −0.001 0.016 0.018 0.002 −0.002
F full-time prior 0.691 0.728 0.038** 0.700 0.732 0.031** 0.006
F high school 0.553 0.608 0.055** 0.543 0.583 0.040** 0.015**
F college 0.226 0.248 0.022** 0.235 0.237 0.001 0.021**
F age 33.409 33.830 0.421** 33.020 33.409 0.388** 0.032
F immigrant 0.072 0.075 0.003 0.070 0.076 0.006** −0.003
F on welfare 0.056 0.047 −0.009** 0.064 0.060 −0.005** −0.004
F urban area 0.747 0.747 0.000 0.737 0.748 0.011** −0.011*
N 29,640 29,365 28,533 29,642
Notes: Mean or share of indicated variable with differences. Earnings are inﬂation adjusted with 1997 as base year (in NOK). +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels
respectively (two-sided t-test).
131N. Drange, M. Rege / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 125–136and ﬁve-year-olds in a given year. The ﬁrst cohort of partly treated
children turns two in 1998, while the ﬁrst cohort of fully treated children
turns two in 2000. Looking at the trends in full-time employment, we
ﬁrst note that, consistent with our identifying assumption, the trends
seem fairly similar for the years prior to the policy change in 1998.
Then there is a relative drop in the labor force participation of
mothers of two-year-olds compared with mothers of ﬁve-year-olds in
1998–2000. This is consistent with an effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy
on mothers' full-time employment when the child is two years old.
Looking at the trends in earnings, we see a similar pattern. The pre-
reform trends are similar for the two age groups. For mothers of two-
year-olds, there is a relative drop in earnings in 1998 and 1999,
compared with mothers of ﬁve-year-olds.
Table 1 provides summary statistics for full-time employment and
earnings at different child ages, and for key background characteris-
tics.29 First, focusing on the outcome variables in Panel A, we can see a
decrease in full-time labor force participation among mothers of two-
year-olds between post- and pre-treatment, whereas mothers of ﬁve-
year-olds slightly increased their full-time labor force participation
between post- and pre-treatment. The unadjusted difference-in-
difference estimate is signiﬁcant and consistent with an effect of the29 See Section 4 for a detailed list of all covariates included in the analysis.Cash-for-Care subsidy on mothers' full-time employment when the
child is two years old. There is also some evidence consistent with
persisting effects of the Cash-for-Care subsidy at age four, after subsidy
eligibility has expired. We can see that mothers of four-year-olds
increased their full-time employment between post-reform and
pre-reform, but less so than mothers of seven-years-olds. The un-
adjusted difference-in-difference estimate is signiﬁcant. However, this
effect seems to have dissipated when the treated children reached age
seven,when the unadjusted difference-in-difference estimate is smaller
and no longer statistically signiﬁcant. Not surprisingly, looking at differ-
ences in earnings we see the same pattern, reﬂecting the changes in full
time employment for the different groups of mothers.
When considering the covariates in Table 1, Panels B andC, there seem
to be a few changes among parents of treated children that do not corre-
spond to changes among the parents of children in the comparison group.
There seems to be an increase in the number of familieswith two children
in the comparison group post-reform. Furthermore, we see that mothers
and fathers with children from later cohorts are more likely to have
ﬁnished college than are mothers and fathers of the older children. This
possibly relates to general trends in education of the population during
the period.30We also note that while the share of singlemothers is stable
in the treatment group, it decreases somewhat in the comparison group.30 Statistikkbanken, Statistics Norway.
Table 2
The effect of Cash-for-Care on mothers' full-time employment.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Age 2 −0.041** −0.040** −0.040** −0.040** −0.040** −0.034**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.005)
Age 3 −0.039** −0.038** −0.038** −0.037** −0.037** −0.033**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 4 −0.022** −0.021** −0.021** −0.020** −0.020** −0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 5 −0.010 −0.009 −0.009+ −0.009+ −0.009+ −0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006)
Age 6 −0.007 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 −0.006 −0.003
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 7 −0.005 −0.004 −0.005 −0.004 −0.004 −0.000
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
N = 117,180
Included covariates
Child char. X X X X X
Mother char. X X X X
Father char. X X X
Unemployment X X
Unemployment ×
age
X
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimates are
based on OLS on Eq. (2) with the dependent variable being whether the mother is full time
employed. We estimate the model separately for different ages. We follow the cohort of
fully treated children born in 1998 as two-year-olds in 2000, three-year-olds in 2001, etc.
For all ages, Model 1 is run without covariates. In the following ﬁve models, we add the
following variables: child's characteristics, mother's characteristics, father's characteristics,
municipality-speciﬁc unemployment rate in the year when the treated children turned
two, and in Model 6, the same unemployment rate interacted with the age of the child. Ro-
bust standard errors (in parenthesis) are clustered on the child's mother and account for
heteroscedasticity and nonindependence of residuals across mothers' labor force participa-
tion observed at different points in time. All speciﬁcations include municipality ﬁxed effects.
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who lived in densely populated areas. This might inﬂuence the labor
force attachment if there is a higher unemployment rate in rural areas.
As described in our empirical strategy, we account for possible ob-
servable changes in the composition of the post- and pre-reform groups
by including a rich set of parental and child characteristics (described in
Section 4). We also add covariates sequentially in order to investigate if
differential trends or observed changes in the composition of the groups
affect our estimates. Moreover, we address the concern of differential
effects of different labor market conditions by including controls for
the local unemployment rate interacted with the age of the child.5.2. Mothers' labor supply
Table 2 presents our main results. In Model 1, we report the
unadjusted difference-in-difference estimate for how the Cash-for-
Care reform affected full-time employment of mothers of fully treated
children (born 1998) at different ages for the child. We can see a large
and signiﬁcant effect of the Cash-for-Care reform on mothers' labor
force participation in the years when the child turns two and three
years old. This is the age at which the parents are fully or partly eligible
for the subsidy. The estimate suggests that the subsidy decreased full-
time employment among mothers of two-year-olds by about four per-
centage points, which is similar to the estimates in other studies
(Schøne, 2004a; Drange, 2012).3131 Notably, at age three the effect of the Cash-for-Care is virtually the sameas for age two.
This may seem odd since the age three children are in average only eligible for half a year.
In Tables 5 and 6 we can see that with earnings or “any labor market attachment” as de-
pendent variables, the treatment effects are substantially larger at age two than at age
three.Following the development in mothers' labor supply as their child
grows older, we observe that when the affected child is four years old
and no longer eligible for the subsidy, there is still a signiﬁcant effect on
mothers' full-time employment. The subsidy decreased full-time employ-
ment among mothers of four-year-olds by about two percentage points.
This suggests that about 50% of themotherswho exited full-time employ-
mentwhen their childwas twoyears old and eligible for the subsidywere
still not working full time in the year after the subsidy expired.When the
treated child is ﬁve–seven years old, we can see that the difference-in-
difference estimates are smaller than at age four andno longer signiﬁcant.
As discussed in the Empirical strategy section, one concern for the
validity of our identifying assumption could be compositional changes
among the different groups of mothers. In Models 2, 3, and 4, we inves-
tigate robustness by stepwise adding covariates capturing the child and
parental characteristics described in Section 4. We can see that adding
child-, mother- and father-speciﬁc characteristics has very small im-
pacts on the estimates. This indicates that our estimates are not biased
by compositional changes among the different groups of mothers.
Another concern for our identifying assumption is unemployment
shocks that affectmothers differently dependingon the age of their chil-
dren. We investigate this concern in Models 5 and 6 by adding controls
for local unemployment rates, linearly and interacted with the child's
age. We can see that the effect estimates are robust to these inclusions,
suggesting that the estimates are not biased by local unemployment
shocks that affect mothers with children of different ages differently.
5.3. Speciﬁcation analysis
In the speciﬁcation analysis in Table 3, we further investigate the va-
lidity of our identifying assumption. The matrix reports unadjusted
difference-in-difference estimates of effects on labor supply formothers
with children of different ages across different years. The comparison
year is 1996 and the comparison group is mothers of eight-year-olds
(mothers of eight-year-olds were not affected by the subsidy during
the years included in the matrix): The matrix compares differences in
labor supply between mothers of eight year-olds and mothers of
children aged two to seven; and how these differences change across
years. To understand the matrix better, consider the estimate at age
two in year 2000 of negative 0.048. This difference-in-difference esti-
mate corresponds to the ﬁrst estimate in Model 1 in Table 2 with two
important differences: in the matrix, the comparison year is 1996 in-
stead of 1997, and the comparison group is mothers of eight-year-old
children instead of mothers of ﬁve-year-olds.32
This matrix has two purposes. First, it demonstrates that our esti-
mates are robust to other choices of comparison year and age. Second,
thematrix allows us to investigate carefullywhether the treatment effect
appears in a way that is consistent with the introduction of the Cash-for-
Care reform. In particular, if our effect estimates in Table 2 are due to the
Cash-for-Care reform, thenwe should see a pattern in Table 3 that is sim-
ilar to the shading in Fig. 2. We should not see any effects in the non-
shaded cells, as these are mothers of non-treated children. We may see
some effects in the lightly shaded cells, as these are mothers of partly
treated children. We should see effects in the darkly shaded cells, at
least for mothers of two- and three-year-olds, as these are mothers of
fully treated children. If the reform has persisting effects, thenwe should
also see an effect on older children in darkly shaded cells.
We can see that the estimates appear largely consistent with the in-
troduction of the Cash-for-Care reform. All the coefﬁcients in the darkly
shaded cells with fully treated children are large and signiﬁcant, even at
ages four and ﬁve.We can also see that several coefﬁcients in the lightly32 Additionally, the robustnessmatrix has a different sample selection criterion. In order
to include all ages of children across a large number of years, we include all children with
no younger siblings in the outcome year (Table 2 uses childrenwith no younger siblings at
age seven).
Table 3
Speciﬁcation analysis.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003
Age 2 – −0.010+ −0.020** −0.042** −0.048** −0.059** −0.060** −0.055**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 3 – −0.005 −0.002 −0.017** −0.029** −0.036** −0.044** −0.035**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 4 – −0.003 0.001 −0.002 −0.011+ −0.018** −0.028** −0.024**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Age 5 – −0.009+ −0.004 0.001 −0.003 −0.007 −0.020** −0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 6 – −0.002 −0.000 0.001 0.003 0.005 −0.005 −0.007
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 7 – −0.007 −0.001 −0.003 −0.003 0.002 −0.007 −0.002
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Age 8 – – – – – – –
N 1,999,083
R sq 0.003
Mean 0.359
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimations are based on one OLS estimation. The matrix reports the unadjusted difference-in-difference es-
timates at different ages for the child in different years Changes in all years are measured relative to 1996, and the reference age is eight. Because of data constraints, this matrix is run
without covariates. A childwill be excluded from the sample in the yearwhen themother gives birth to a new sibling. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the child's mother
and account for heteroscedasticity and nonindependence of residuals across mothers' labor force participation observed at different points in time.
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in 1997, among whom many were close to being fully treated. Impor-
tant for our identifying assumption, we can see that in most of the
cells with no shading, the difference-in-difference estimates are small
and insigniﬁcant. This suggests that trends in labor supply between
mothers of children of different ages are similar prior to the reform,
supporting our identifying assumption. Notably, there is a weakly sig-
niﬁcant difference-in-difference estimate at age two in 1997. This may
reﬂect behavioral changes in expectation of the Cash-for-Care subsidy.5.4. Subsample analysis and alternative dependent variables
In Table 4 we investigate the differential effects of Cash-for-Care
across different levels of education and pre-birth earnings. All subsam-
ple analyses use our preferred model from Table 2, Model 6. Several in-
teresting patterns emerge. Comparing Models 1 and 2, we can see thatTable 4
Subsample analysis: Full-time employment.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mother
ﬁnished college
Mother not
ﬁnished college
Former earnings
below median
Former earnings
above median
Age 2 −0.033** −0.033** −0.025** −0.034**
(0.010) (0.005) (0.005) (0.008)
Age 3 −0.034** −0.034** −0.037** −0.027**
(0.011) (0.006) (0.006) (0.008)
Age 4 −0.006 −0.022** −0.027** −0.008
(0.011) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 5 0.004 −0.012* −0.014* −0.008
(0.012) (0.006) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 6 0.010 −0.008 −0.009 −0.003
(0.012) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008)
Age 7 0.011 −0.006 −0.002 −0.005
(0.012) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009)
N 29,682 87,498 58,604 58,576
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimates are
based onOLS of Eq. (2)with the outcomebeingwhether themother has a full-time attach-
ment to the labor market. We estimate themodel separately for different ages. We follow
the cohort of fully treated children born in 1998 as two-year-olds in 2000, three-year-olds
in 2001, etc. The covariates described in Section 4 are included. Robust standard errors (in
parentheses) are clustered on the child's mother and account for heteroscedasticity and
nonindependence of the residuals across mothers' labor force participation observed at
different points in time. All regressions include municipality ﬁxed effects.Cash-for-Care subsidy affects the full-time employment of mothers of
two- and three-year-olds similarly across education level.33 Moreover,
comparing Models 3 and 4 we can see that subsidy affects mothers of
two- and three-year-old children similarly across baseline earnings
level. Even if the short term effects are similar, we observe that when
the child is four and ﬁve years old the negative effects of the Cash-for-
Care subsidy are only prevalent amongmothers without college educa-
tion and mothers who were low earners at baseline. Mothers with col-
lege education and mothers with above median earnings at baseline
are back in a full-time position to the same extent as the non-treated
mothers.
In Table 5, we investigate the effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy on
mothers' earnings. The structure of this table is identical to Table 4;
however, full-time employment is replacedwith earnings as the depen-
dent variable. Importantly, because employment is endogenous to the
reform, we include the same sample of mothers and do not focus on
employed mothers only. Interestingly, we see in Model 1 that there
are no effects of the Cash-for-Care subsidy on earnings for highly edu-
cated mothers when they are no longer eligible for the subsidy. This is
somewhat surprising, as above 3% of these mothers exited full-time
employment when eligible for the Cash-for-Care subsidy (Model 1,
Table 4). As discussed in the Introduction, we know from theories of
human capital that career breaks or part time employment may lead
to a relative decrease in work-related human capital accumulation,
which should be reﬂected in subsequent earnings.
In Model 2, we see signiﬁcant effects of the subsidy on earnings for
less-educated mothers of four year-old children. For mothers of four-
year-olds, the estimate corresponds to a reduction of about 2% com-
pared to the mean value of earnings in the group of mothers of four
year-olds in 1997 (NOK 113,287). This reduction in earnings may re-
ﬂect a relative loss in human capital in addition to the reduction in full
time employment that we can see in Model 2 in Table 5. In Models 3
and 4, we can see a similar result. For the mothers with baseline earn-
ings above the median, there are no effects of the Cash-for-Care subsidy
on earnings at ages four and ﬁve. However, for mothers with earnings
below the median, there seems to be indication of a negative estimate
at age four, but the standard errors are large, and we cannot rule out a
zero effect.33 Note, however, that even though the effects are similar at the margin, the percentage
reduction in each subsample is different. The mean of the full-time employed among the
college educated is 0.45. Thus, the reduction in this group is 8%,while in the groupwithout
a college education, the reduction is 15% (mean is 0.25).
Table 5
Subsample analysis: Earnings.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mother ﬁnished
college
Mother not
ﬁnished college
Former earnings
below median
Former earnings
above median
Age 2 −6283** −9133** −8586** −6994**
(1587) (808) (989) (1069)
Age 3 −3124+ −4916** −5674** −2530*
(1764) (920) (1119) (1181)
Age 4 −463 −1948* −2244+ 127
(1834) (955) (1186) (1193)
Age 5 748 −576 −224 279
(1925) (997) (1231) (1251)
Age 6 1999 158 652 749
(2014) (1034) (1270) (1306)
Age 7 2378 −410 393 −592
(2001) (1007) (1251) (1269)
N 29,682 87,498 58,604 58,576
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimates are
based on OLS of Eq. (2) with the outcome being mothers' linear earnings. Earnings are in-
ﬂation adjusted with 1997 as the base year (in NOK), and censored at the 99th percentile.
We estimate the model separately for different ages. We follow the cohort of fully treated
children born in 1998 as two-year-olds in 2000, three-year-olds in 2001, etc. The covari-
ates described in Section 4 are included. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clus-
tered on the child's mother and account for heteroscedasticity and non-independence of
residuals across mothers' labor force participation observed at different points in time.
All regressions include municipality ﬁxed effects. 1 Euro = 8.1 NOK (2000).
Table 7
Robustness.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Fig. 4. Children born by year and month.
134 N. Drange, M. Rege / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 125–136Comparing to the results in Table 4, Table 5 suggests that mothers
who were closely attached to the labor market prior to birth and who
chose to exit at ages one and two did not experience a reduction in
human capital. The reduction in earnings formotherswhohad aweaker
attachment to the labormarketmay reﬂect a relative loss in human cap-
ital in addition to the reduction in full-time employment. To understand
the differences in long term effects across subsamples better, we now
turn to Table 6, where we investigate the effect of the Cash-for-Care
subsidy on mothers' employment. This table has the same structure as
Tables 4 and 5; however, the dependent variable is replaced with em-
ployment, which includes minor part-time and part-time in addition
to full-time employment.Table 6
Subsample analysis: Employment.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Mother ﬁnished
college
Mother not
ﬁnished college
Former earnings
below median
Former earnings
above median
Age 2 −0.009 −0.040** −0.047** −0.012**
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Age 3 −0.001 −0.008 −0.011 0.002
(0.006) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Age 4 0.003 −0.004 −0.001 0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Age 5 0.004 0.003 0.006 0.006*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.007) (0.003)
Age 6 0.003 0.004 0.005 0.008*
(0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.003)
Age 7 −0.005 0.004 0.005 −0.002
(0.005) (0.004) (0.006) (0.003)
N 29,682 87,498 58,604 58,576
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimates are
based on OLS of Eq. (2) with the dependent variable being whether the mother works full
time, part time or minor part time. We estimate the model separately for different ages.
We follow the cohort of fully treated children born in 1998 as two-year-olds in 2000,
three-year-olds in 2001, etc. The covariates described in Section 4 are included. Robust stan-
dard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the child's mother and account for
heteroscedasticity and nonindependence of residuals across mothers' labor force participa-
tion observed at different points in time. All regressions include municipality ﬁxed effects.We can see that Table 6 displays a quite different picture compared
to Tables 4 and 5. The Cash-for-Care subsidy has very small effects on
employment already by age three in all sub-groups. This suggests that
most mothers remained attached to the labor market through part-
time employment, even if they withdrew from full time employment
for an extended period. This ﬁnding is consistent with the ﬁndings in
Schøne (2004b)who investigates how the Cash-for-Care subsidy affect-
ed employment of mothers with children age one-three. In Models 1
and 4 we can see that this is particularly true for mothers with college
education and high earning mothers. This part time attachment to the
labor force may provide one explanation for why these mothers did
not experience a persistent decrease in earnings (see Table 5), despite
the fact that many exited full time employment when eligible for the
Cash-for-Care (see Table 4).Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Full time employment Full time employment Having a new child
by age 7
Age 2 −0.009 −0.029**
(0.006) (0.003)
Age 3 0.002 −0.024**
(0.006) (0.003)
Age 4 −0.006 −0.016**
(0.006) (0.003)
Age 5 0.001 −0.008*
(0.006) (0.004)
Age 6 0.005 0.009*
(0.006) (0.004)
Age 7 −0.001 0.011** 0.001
(0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
N 118,034 239,698 239,698
Sample Untreated cohorts born
1989, 1992 and 1995
Same as main model,
but without restrictions
Same as main model,
but without restrictions
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% level. Model 1 reports results
from estimations based on OLS on Eq. (2) with outcome being full time employment
and the sample is based on the same selection criteria as the main sample, but belonging
to non-treated cohorts (born 1989, 1992 and 1995). Due to data restrictions, Model 1 does
not include covariates or municipality ﬁxed effects.Model 2 and 3 are estimations on a full
sample including the entire cohorts of children, and include the covariates listed in Table 1.
Model 2 reports results from estimations based on OLS on Eq. (2) with outcome being full
time employment, whereas Model 3 report results from estimations based on OLS on
Eq. (2) with outcome being if the mother has a new child by age 7. In all models we esti-
mate the model separately for different ages. Robust standard errors (in parenthesis) are
clustered on the child's mother and account for heteroscedasticity and non-independence
of residuals across parents' labor force participation observed at different points in time.
Model 2 and 3 include municipality ﬁxed effects.
Table 8
Robustness: Covariates as outcome variables.
Source: Administrative registers: FD Trygd.
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Mother full
time baseline
Father full
time baseline
Mother
income
baseline
Father
income
baseline
Mother
ﬁnished
high school
Father
ﬁnished
high school
0.002 0.003 −1011 4844** −0.000 0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (848) (1484) (0.006) (0.006)
N = 117,180.
Notes: +, * and ** denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5 and 1% levels respectively. Estimates are
based onOLS of Eq. (2)with the outcome being a new covariate in eachmodel, respective-
ly: Mother and father former full time employment, mother and father former earnings
and mother and father high school completion share. Other covariates described in
Section 4 are included. Robust standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on the child's
mother (father) and account for heteroscedasticity and nonindependence of the residuals
acrossmothers' (fathers') labor force participation observed at different points in time. All
regressions include municipality ﬁxed effects.
34 See, for instance, Berger et al. (2004), Baker and Milligan (2008) and Schönberg and
Ludsteck (2011).
135N. Drange, M. Rege / Labour Economics 24 (2013) 125–136In Models 2 and 3 we can see that also mothers with low education
and mothers with low earnings remain attached to the labor force
through part-time employment, but less so than high educated and
high earning mothers. This may provide an explanation for why we
see a more persistent effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy on these
mothers labor supply (see Tables 4 and 5).
5.5. Further robustness
We start by considering possible selection into the treatment group,
i.e. into being born 1998. Parents that would otherwise have wanted to
conceive a child early 1997might have waited until after the election in
order to have greater certainty about the subsidy. This would result in a
reduction of children born late 1997, and a surge in children born sec-
ond half of 1998. Fig. 4 below displays the number of children born by
month in the years 1996, 1997 and 1998. Little indicates that the reform
affected timing of birth; there are small variations throughout the year,
but nothing stands out.
To further explore our identifying assumption, the ﬁrst model in
Table 7 provides estimates from a placebo model in which we assume
that the reform took place three years earlier. The estimated model is
identical to our preferred model 6 in Table 2 with one important differ-
ence; all observations and sample restrictions are moved three years
forward in time. If preexisting trends affected labor supply differently
in the treatment and comparison groups, wewould discern a treatment
effect in the years before the Cash-for-Care subsidywas introduced. It is
clear from the ﬁrst column in Table 7 that there is no indication of a
preexisting diverging trend. This holds as the children grow older as
well.
Another concern raised in Section 3 was that the sample selection
criteria could bias the results. We are in particular worried about a pos-
sible subsidy effect on fertility. As discussed in Section 3, we restrict the
sample to children who have no younger siblings at age seven in order
to ensure that the older children in the control group do not have treat-
ed siblings, which may bias our estimates downward. This restriction
may raise an endogeneity concern if the Cash-for-Care reform affected
fertility. In Model 2 in Table 7, we demonstrate that our results are ro-
bust to the inclusion of children with younger siblings. As expected,
the estimates are somewhat smaller, butwe still see negative and signif-
icant effects on full-time employment among mothers of children
2–5 years old.
Moreover, in Model 3 in Table 7 we report results from a regression
on whether the child has a new sibling by year seven. It is reassuring
that the coefﬁcient is a precisely estimated zero, suggesting that the co-
horts included in treatment and comparison groups are not experienc-
ing different fertility trends by year seven due to the subsidy.
As mentioned when discussing Table 2, a concern in difference-in-
difference models is changes in the composition of included groupsover time. An alternative approach to address this concern is to estimate
our preferred model (Model 6 in Table 2); however, using key covari-
ates at baseline as the dependent variable, and – of course – omitting
these variables as covariates. Table 8 reports the results from this spec-
iﬁcation analysis, utilizing the following baseline variables as the depen-
dent variable for both themother and the father: Full time employment,
earnings, and indicator for high school completion. We can see that
none of the estimates are signiﬁcant, except for the estimate on fathers'
baseline earnings (Model 4 in Table 8). From Table 2 we know that fa-
thers of children in the comparison group post reform have lower
prior earnings. We rely on that controlling for fathers' prior earnings
will address the sample composition issue.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we address the concern that temporary labor market
exits while the children are young may lead to long-run deterioration
of women's post-birth careers. We investigate how mothers' decision
to stay at home with young children affects their subsequent work ca-
reers. For identiﬁcation, we utilize the introduction of a Cash-for-Care
subsidy, which was universal and paid any parent a signiﬁcant allow-
ance if they did not utilize publicly subsidized child care for their one-
or two-year-old child. The subsidy substantially decreased the labor
force participation of mothers of one- and two-year-olds (Schøne,
2004a,b; Drange, 2012). We demonstrate that, for mothers without a
university degree or with pre-reform earnings below the median, the
program had effects on earnings and full-time employment even
when the child was no longer eligible for Cash-for-Care at ages four
and ﬁve. However, from age six, we can no longer see any effects. For
the sub-sample of mothers with high education or high earnings,
there is no effect of the Cash-for-Care subsidy at ages four and ﬁve.
Further analysis suggests that the effects of the Cash-for-Care subsi-
dy dissipate because most mothers who exit full time employment
while the children are young remain attached to the labor force through
part-time employment. Norway is known for a very ﬂexible labor mar-
ketwith a high share of part-time employment. Such part-time employ-
ment may limit the loss in human capital and relevant network when
exiting full time employment. Our ﬁndings are consistent with several
studies that have emphasized the importance of a continued attach-
ment to the labor market in securing labor supply post-birth.34
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